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SUCCESSOR CORPORATION PRODUCTS
LIABILITY-SIX OR MORE
CHARACTERS IN SEARCH
OF AN AUTHOR
JERRY J. PHILLIPS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently described
the state of successor corporation products liability as "caught up in the
swirling cross currents of products liability and corporate successor re-
sponsibility."' Indeed it is. What is the key-or what should be the
key-to successor liability? A host of apparently relevant factors moil
around: shareholder continuity; officer or director continuity; continuity
of employees or of key personnel; continuation of the same product line,
including design, blueprints, logo, trade name, goodwill, corporate name
and plant location; dissolution of the predecessor; and the successor
holding itself out as essentially a continuation of the predecessor. A sub-
current of litigation also exists regarding the duty of the successor corpo-
ration or entity, B, to warn or take other remedial action concerning
products manufactured or sold by the predecessor entity, A, whether or
not B is considered the legal or de facto successor of A.
One can attribute a large part of the uncertainty in this area to the
inability of courts to settle on a policy rationale for imposing successor
liability. A number of courts have expressed concern about the possible
adverse effect of successor liability on small corporations. Other courts
are concerned about the apparent inequity of imposing liability on a suc-
cessor that did not make the product in question and, therefore, did not
cause the injury. They are further troubled by the perceived absence of
any deterrent value in placing liability on a corporation that did not man-
ufacture the offending product and thus could not have prevented the
injury. Still other courts have difficulty applying the doctrine when B
does not purchase all the assets of A, when A continues in existence after
* W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. A.B. Yale University 1956; M.A.
Cambridge University 1958; J.D. Yale Law School 1961.
I thank my colleague Durward S. Jones for his helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986).
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an asset purchase by B, or when B purchases A's assets in a bankruptcy
sale. These last concerns evidence a desire to find some kind of fault on
the part of B for making suit against A impractical, as well as concerns
about continuity between A and B.
Luigi Pirandello, in his play Six Characters In Search Of An Author,2
presents the dilemma of six characters created by an author who refuses
to write the play in which they can act out their roles. The characters go
to a play manager and ask him to write their play for them, yet they
insist on providing the script, even down to the minutest detail of stage
props and voice intonation. Ironically, the author, in spite of his protes-
tations, is the creator of each of the six characters, and they are only as
real as he makes them. In an introduction to his collection of plays of
Pirandello, Eric Bentley writes, "[t]his is the place to remember to how
large an extent form is meaning." 3
In trying to write the successor corporation products liability drama,
courts must face more than six characters, all clamoring to be heard, and
all trying to shape the play by their own conception of continuity. In
Pirandello's play, one character, the Son, tries to remain uninvolved in
the writing of the script. Yet the Father says of the Son: "He says he
doesn't come into the affair, whereas he is really the hinge of the whole
action." 4 That linchpin character in successor corporation liability has
yet to be identified clearly and rationalized by the courts. How that
character is defined, however, depends on the questions we ask and deem
important. Are we concerned about deterrence, causation, certainty in
the law, economics, or something else? The answer, of course, varies
depending on which question one asks and the importance one assigns it.
Probably the underlying explanation for imposing products liability on
a successor corporation is what I have elsewhere described as the cloning
or "look-alike" rationale.' To a large extent, as Bentley reminds us, 6
2. L. PIRANDELLO, Six Characters in Search of an Author, in NAKED MASKS: FivE PLAYS
BY LUIGI PIRANDELLO 211-276 (E. Bentley ed. 1952).
3. Bentley, NAKED MASKS: FIVE PLAYS BY LUIGI PIRANDELLO (E. Bentley ed. 1952) at xxii.
4. L. PIRANDELLO, supra note 2, at 234.
5. Phillips, Reply: Product Line Continuity As The Basis For Successor Corporation Liability,
31 WAYNE L. REV. 149, 152 (1984). The business continuity theory proposed by the author asserts
that a successor should be held liable for its predecessor's torts when the predecessor's business is
"deemed metamorphosed into" the successor's business. Id. at 152. Under this proposal, a prede-
cessor's business is effectively continued for purposes of imposing successor liability when the succes-
sor "clones" the predecessor after the purchase. Id. at 151-52.
The Father in Six Characters has a ready reply for the above explanation: "Phrasesl Isn't anyone
consoled when faced with a trouble or fact he doesn't understand, by a word, some simple word,
[Vol. 67:335
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form is meaning. Our task as lawyers-in this area as in others-is to
determine the form we wish to give to meaning. Explanations, and criti-
cisms, are ready at hand for any form chosen. The best form, however,
will be the one that seems most in keeping with both felt traditions and
the current needs of our times.7
My own predilection is still for the cloning, or look-alike, approach.
Regrettably, in this area as in others no bright line rule seems practical.
The basic concerns of tort law, causation and deterrence, cannot, how-
ever, be ignored. It may be that the linchpin in these concerns is the
continuing duty to warn or to take other remedial action-a duty that
this area of products liability has so far largely ignored.
II. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE LAW
When B purchases the business of A, B can be held liable for injuries
caused by defective products sold by A before the business purchase, even
though the injuries do not occur until after the purchase. This liability
can arise by an agreement between B and A to assume such liabilities, or
as the result of a fraudulent transfer of assets from A to B in an attempt
to avoid the creditors of A, but these situations rarely occur.8 More com-
monly, liability is imposed based on findings of (1) a continuation of A's
business by B, (2) the dissolution of A as soon as reasonably practicable
after the sale of the business to B, (3) the assumption by B of the obliga-
tions of A necessary for the normal operation of the business, and (4) B's
holding itself out to the public as continuing the business originally
owned by A.9
Factors (1) and (4) can be collapsed into a single consideration, be-
cause if B continues the business of A it inherently holds itself out as
doing so, and conversely no effective holding out occurs in the absence of
which tells us nothing and yet calms us?" Nonetheless, the Father's remarks are in response to the
Son's sneering at a phrase, "the Demon of Experiment," which is central to the Father's and the
author's concept of reality. L. PIRANDELLO, supra note 2, at 222, 234. Compare Berkey v. Third
Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.").
6 Bentley, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. "The process by which society accomodates to change without abandoning its fundamental
structure is what we mean by law." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 14 (1977).
8. See Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 906, 908 (1983).
9. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (citing McKee
v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 561, 264 A.2d 98, 103-05 (1970)). Accord Menacho v.
Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
1989]
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such a business continuation."° The third factor, assumption of ordinary
business obligations, seems never to be determinative. The courts would
probably treat continuation of A's business by B without the assumption
of A's normal business obligations as a business transfer for inadequate
consideration, thus giving rise to the imposition of successor liability.'"
Litigation today centers on the first two factors, whether B is continuing
the business of A, and whether A has dissolved as soon as practicable
after the business transfer. Commentary today has also focused, errone-
ously, on providing escapes for small corporations from successor liabil-
ity. This Article discusses each of these trends in turn below.
A. Business Continuation
The list of items that determine whether there is a business continua-
tion, or de facto merger,' 2 is extensive and includes covenants not to
compete and acquisition of assets, inventory, equipment, plant, trade
names, trademarks, logos, goodwill, designs, blueprints, and customer
lists. " Successor liability does not turn on the presence or absence of any
10. In Pelc v. Bendix Machine Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343, 314 N.W.2d 614 (1981), the court
found no basis for imposing successor liability when B purchased less than eight percent of A's
bankrupt estate, B did not cause the bankruptcy, and virtually no employee continuity existed.
Although B "did hold itself out to the world as the effective continuation" of A by name, advertising,
and other factors, "none of the cases have justified the imposition of liability solely upon this one
factor." 111 Mich. App. at 354, 314 N.W.2d at 619.
11. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 29, 560 P.2d 3, 7, 136 Cal. Rptr, 574, 578 (1977).
12. The de facto merger exception, which results in liability for the successor corporation, is
much akin to the business continuation exception. Under both, the successor B is liable for the
predecessor's debts when B "effectively has become the selling corporation by acquiring not only
[A's] assets but also its entire business." Phillips, supra note 8, at 909. When a de facto merger
occurs the effect is the same as when a de jure merger occurs: the purchasing corporation becomes
"unquestionably" liable for the predecessor's debts. Id. at 907.
13. Continuity of business enterprise includes "retention of key personnel, assets, general busi-
ness, and trade name." Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 612, 689 P.2d 368, 386
(1984). The court in Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp 1282, 1283, 1285 (D.
Colo. 1984), found product line continuity where B purchased all the assets of A except cash, ac-
counts receivable, and intangible personal property; key management employees of A stayed with B
for one year after the acquisition "to assist in the transition of the business"; and B held itself out "to
potential customers as the same enterprise manufacturing the same product. . . ." In Holloway v.
John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. supp. 454 (D.S.C. 1977), the court denied B's motion for summary
judgment where plaintiff's evidence showed that B continued A's business at the same address with
virtually the same employees, manufactured the same or similar products, and held itself out to the
public under a name virtually identical to that of A. In Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F.
Supp. 349, 350 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the court imposed successor liability where the sale
included good will, historical data, business records, external correspondence with custom-
ers, trade secrets, patents, trademarks, designs, patterns, jigs, fixtures, and equipment
which relate solely to the manufacture or sale of die cutting presses. The seller was re-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/3
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one or more of these items, and drawing a bright line in this regard is
impractical.14
Additional factors that some courts consider determinative are
whether there is (a) shareholder continuity, (b) officer or director con-
tinuity, and (c) key personnel and employee continuity between A and
B.15 It is difficult to see why some courts consider these factors essential
to successor liability, and the combination of these factors necessary to
impose successor liability is unclear.1 6 Specifically, courts have not clari-
quired to forward to the buyer all inquiries relating to such business for a period of five (5)
years. The contract of sale also included a ten-year non-competition clause; provided for
training of the buyer's employees and for providing technical assistance; and anticipated
that for a period of up to five (5) years presses manufactured by the buyer could contain the
following name: "Sheridan Die Cutting Press manufactured by Bruno-Sherman
Corporation."
In Savini v. Kent Machine Works, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the court refused to
impose successor liability where B acquired only the trademark and trade name of A. In LaPollo v.
General Elec. Co., 664 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1987), on the other hand, successor liability was not
imposed because B was prohibited from using A's trademarks and trade names for more than six
months after the business purchase. The court held in the alternative that successor liability was
inappropriate because A continued in existence after the business sale to B.
In Turner v. Wean United, Inc., PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 11, 937 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1988), the
court held that a successor corporation is not liable under continuity of enterprise where production
of the product by the successor "was in a different location, under a different trade name, and by a
different work force."
14. The court in Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136, 143 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
noted the three criteria established in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 430, 244
N.W.2d 873, 879 (1976), for determining successor enterprise liability: (1) continuity of manage-
ment and business; (2) cessation of operations and dissolution by the seller as soon as legally and
practically possible; and (3) assumption by the purchaser of those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the normal continuation of seller's business. These criteria, said the
Korzetz court, are not "ironclad elements." Rather, they "are only guidelines." The fact, therefore,
"that the transferor is not dissolved immediately or does not assume all liabilities necessary for
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations, does not conclusively establish disconti-
nuity of interest when there is other strong and convincing evidence of continuity of enterprise." 472
F. Supp. at 143-44. See also Amader v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (in determining successor liability the criteria should not be construed "too tightly").
15. Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988) (no successor
liability because, among other reasons, "there was no common identity of incorporators, officers,
directors, or stockholders"). Accord Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848 (1st Cir.
1986); Tucker v. Paxson Machine Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (successor liability requires
continuity of shareholders and management); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797
(W.D. Mich. 1974) (continuity of shareholders and management required).
16. Florum v. Elliott Mfg. Co., 629 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (D. Colo. 1986) (successor liability
based on continuity of enterprise not applied where there was "no common identity of stock, direc-
tors, offices, or stockholders"; the fact that the successor "did retain the existing employees but not
the management" was insufficient for purposes of continuity); Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chem., 518
F. Supp. 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (successor liability imposed where there was continuity of three top
officers, although apparently there was no stockholder continuity); Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fled whether there must be both shareholder and officer/director con-
tinuity, whether there must be a continuity of both officers and directors,
and whether key personnel or employee continuity or both is a necessary
or an alternative criterion. Moreover, the decisions do not delineate ex-
actly how much shareholder, officer, director, key personnel, or em-
ployee continuity is required.
Apart from the questions of uncertainty associated with shareholder
and employee continuity, it is particularly unclear why courts consider
these factors essential to successor liability when neither adds signifi-
cantly to business continuity in the first place. Under traditional corpo-
rate law, in a de jure merger between A and B the resulting corporation is
liable for the debts of the predecessor corporations. 17 Further, in some
circumstances, although it does not comply with the formal statutory
procedures, a transaction will produce a de facto merger in which the
resulting corporation acquires the liabilities of the predecessors. 8 Tradi-
tionally, a court would find a de facto merger or the mere continuation of
enterprise when the assets of A were exchanged for the stock of B. t9
However, this exchange is no longer typically required as a condition for
de jure merger, and an exchange of assets for cash instead of stock is
widely held to be sufficient to effectuate such a merger.20 As a result of
this change in law, there is no apparent reason why a court should still
Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979) (successor liability where B manufactured the same products as
A using "the same people in the same place" and holding itself out as a continuation of A); Bourque
v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1125, 1127, (La. App. 1985) (for successor liability there must
normally be continuity of "shareholders, directors, officers, or even employees" common to both for
predecessor and the successor business); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 408
(N.H. 1988) (successor liability not imposed where, although B continued manufacturing A's prod-
uct "using substantially the same facility, employees, assets, and middle-level management person-
nel" that A had, there was no continuity of "shareholders, directors, or officers" between A and B);
Burr v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 18 Ohio App. 3d 19, 22, 480 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)
(no successor liability where "there was no mixture of officers or stockholders") (quoting Ortiz v.
South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 847-48, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (1975)); Pulis v. U.S. Elec.
Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 71 (Okla. 1977) (successor liability requires "common identity of stock,
directors, officers or stockholders") (quoting Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821
(Colo. 1968)); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mech., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 519 (S.D. 1986) (no suc-
cessor liability because no continuity of "owners, officers or stockholders" and B's business devel-
oped along a different line from that of A's).
17. Phillips, supra note 8, at 907.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 912.
20. Id. at 914. Nor is stockholder continuity typically required as a condition for successor
products liability. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 86-88 (3d Cir. 1986) (Mansmann,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/3
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require a stock exchange before determining that the successor corpora-
tion is liable under the de facto merger exception for products sold by the
predecessor. The key to successor liability is business continuity. How-
ever, shareholder continuity does not materially add to business con-
tinuity whether stockholder continuity exists in the predecessor, the
successor, or between predecessor and successor. Corporate stockhold-
ers come and go, but the business of the corporation remains entirely
unaffected by such changes. In addition, the doctrine of successor liabil-
ity is not limited to corporate successors, although its application usually
arises in a corporate context.21 If the successor is a noncorporate enter-
prise, there can be no exchange of stock in the successor for assets of the
predecessor because the successor has no stock, yet the successor may be
held liable for products sold by the predecessor.
According to one commentator, stockholder continuity "is probably
the most important element of the de facto merger exception."22 The
"justification" for this exception is that
[t]he shareholders are the ones who ultimately enjoy the profits and suffer
the losses of the corporation, and the shareholders of one corporation
should not be able to move as a group to another corporation, enjoy the
continuing profits of the same business the corporation performed before
merger, but escape all possible losses that accumulated before merger.23
This statement, however, is not a justification for requiring stockholder
continuity as a condition to imposing successor liability. Rather, it is
merely a statement of the effect of mergers on persons who do in fact
acquire stock of the successor. This effect occurs whether those persons
were stockholders in the predecessor, in another corporation, or in no
corporation at all prior to their stock acquisition.
The second factor deemed relevant by courts, the requirement of per-
sonnel continuity, appears facially more relevant to the issue of business
continuity, if one assumes that B is more likely to carry on substantially
the same business of A where the employees of B after the acquisition are
the same as the employees of A before the acquisition. Indeed, one rea-
son for corporate acquisition may be to acquire needed expertise, repre-
21. See Tift v. Forage King Industries, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982) (successor
liability imposed even though predecessor was a sole proprietorship that continued in existence after
the business transfer).
22. Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L. J. 677, 699
(1983).
23. Id. at 699 n. 124 (quoting Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141,
1148, 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (1982)).
1989]
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sented by employee knowledge and skill.24
The problem with this analysis-as with the issue of stockholder con-
tinuity-is that in actual practice there is no necessary or even likely
correlation between employee continuity and business continuity. Busi-
ness reasons for the acquisition may not require employee continuity if,
for example, the needed expertise lies with the employees of B, rather
than with those of A. The likelihood, if any, of business continuity oc-
curring as the result of employee continuity would seem to depend on
whether the predecessor employees controlled the business of the succes-
sor, although nothing in the cases suggests that such control is a neces-
sary element of the employee continuity issue. Although the usual
purpose of an acquisition resulting in successor liability is to enable the
successor to carry on and benefit from the predecessor's business, em-
ployee continuity does not ensure business continuity; the employees of
A may change the business of A, and the employees of B may continue
the business of A whether or not B acquires any employees of A. If some
degree of employee continuity aids the effectuation of business con-
tinuity, well and good; but certainly one is not a necessary or even a
likely condition of the other. Employees come and go, just as do stock-
holders, but the same business can clearly continue without regard to
such comings and goings.
B. Destruction of Remedy
Courts almost universally require that.4 dissolve as soon as practicable
after selling its business to B, as a condition for imposing liability on B
for injuries caused by defective products sold by 4.25 The California
Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp. stated the predominant reason for
this requirement: B, through acquisition of A's business followed by the
dissolution of 4, has caused the destruction of the claimant's remedy
against A and should therefore fairly be held liable for causing such de-
struction. 6 This rationale seems heavily imbued with the idea that B, by
causing the destruction of A, is at fault for so doing.
The analysis is flawed, however, because courts impose successor lia-
bility whether or not dissolution of A is a condition of the business
purchase agreement between 4 and B. If B does not require A 's dissolu-
24. Id. at 685 n.61.
25. Comment, An Evaluation of the Product Line Theory of Successor Liability, 32 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 219, 231 (1987).
26. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 581 (1977).
[Vol. 67:335
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tion, which nevertheless occurs, B should not be held responsible for
causing the dissolution or, consequently, for the destruction of the claim-
ant's remedy against A. If A decides to dissolve after selling its business
to B, that decision is not in any meaningful way caused by the purchase
by B, and certainly B is not at fault for making a lawful purchase of
business assets that is intended to further the general business
economy.27
Several recent cases deal with the successor liability of a corporation,
B, that purchases the business of A in a bankruptcy proceeding of A.
Most courts have held that B is not liable in this situation for products
sold by A, and they often reach this result by reasoning that B did not
cause the destruction of A because B's purchase did not cause the
bankruptcy.28
The better rationale for the bankruptcy situations is that given by the
court in the case of In re White Motor Credit Corp.29 The court said that
no successor liability attaches for business units purchased in bank-
ruptcy, because the prospect of such liability "would chill and deleteri-
ously affect sales of corporate assets, forcing debtors to accept less on
sales to compensate for this potential liability. This negative effect on
sales would only benefit product liability claimants, thereby subverting
specific statutory priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code."3
Therefore, the court enjoined a products liability claimant from pursuing
its products claim in state court against the purchaser of the bankrupt's
assets.
Judicial insistence that A be dissolved before successor liability is im-
posed on B probably stems from a basic concern about the fairness of
holding B liable at all, because B did not make the offending product and,
therefore, did not cause and could not have prevented the claimant's in-
jury. This attitude reflects the similar bias in some quarters against hold-
ing the nonmanufacturing products seller strictly liable except in those
situations where the manufacturer is not subject to liability. 31 In the suc-
27. Phillips, supra note 8, at 916-17.
28. Nelson v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 778 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Related Asbestos Cases,
578 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Cal 1983). See Comment, supra note 25, at 233-34.
29. 75 Bankr. 944 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
30. Id. at 951.
31. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1987); MD. CTS. AND JUDICIAL PLEADINGS CODE
ANN § 5-311 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 93,517 (1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1978); WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.72.030 (1981).
1989]
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cessor context the concern about fairness may be even greater than in the
nonmanufacturing seller context because the latter, though not at fault,
may at least be seen as a cause of the injury by promoting the product in
the chain of distribution.
Assuming that it is more fair to hold B strictly liable when A is un-
available for suit than when A is available, why should unavailability
turn on the mechanical question of whether or not A has dissolved? The
real issue should be whether or not A can satisfy a judgment against it. If
A cannot, it may as well be nonexistent as far as the claimant is con-
cerned. Why should not the claimant's attorney, moreover, be permitted
to make this complex tactical decision of whom to sue? Any margin of
error in this regard can be corrected through a claim for contribution or
indemnity by B against A. The risks of additional costs from such claims
for contribution or indemnity are probably outweighed by the risks of
claimant or judicial error regarding the ability of A to pay in the first
instance.
Questions of causation and responsibility on the part of B also deserve
attention. If B cannot reasonably be considered responsible for the
claimant's injury, it should not be held liable regardless ofA's availability
for suit.
Questions of cause-in-fact, divorced from the issue of responsibility,
tend to be abstract, approaching the metaphysical. Courts and commen-
tators speak of causation in the general products liability context in a
"stream of commerce" metaphor, with the manufacturer or seller de-
scribed as the one who put the product in that stream. 32 In fact, of
course, the consumer, the advertiser, and the transportation agent may
be just as influential as the manufacturer in marketing a product but
these others are typically not held directly liable for product injuries.
Clearly, therefore, an analysis in terms of pure cause is not particulary
helpful, either in products liability generally or successor liability
specifically.
If a court can fairly attribute responsibility to B, then cause-in-fact
ceases to be a major separate problem. Responsibility in the context of
strict liability, moreover, is defined more broadly than in terms of a duty
of care. The preceding discussion indicates, however, that this responsi-
32. Davis v. Gibson Products Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Baynard, Should
Strict Products Liability Apply to the Sale of Electricity?, 55 TENN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1988).
[Vol. 67:335
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bility cannot be satisfied by B's destruction of the claimant's remedy
against A.
The underlying rationale for holding B liable for products sold by A is
that B, by buying and operating the business of A, has somehow "stepped
into the shoes" of, or "become," A. These metamorphic concepts apply
to B whether or not A .continues to exist.
The transfer of identity from A to B is defined in a variety of ways.
Courts describe the transfer in "holding-out" terms, whereby B induces
the public to believe that it is operating substantially the same business as
A."3 Courts sometimes state that B receives the benefit of A's goodwill,
or business identity.34 The concept of benefit in this context should not
be perceived strictly in economic terms. Such a narrow conception has
led some commentators to question why B should be made to pay for
goodwill twice-at the time of the business purchase, and later in prod-
ucts liability--or why B should be made in any event to pay more for
goodwill than the parties bargained for." The better conception of good-
will in this context is more closely akin to the cost-of-doing-business ra-
tionale used as a fundamental explanation for imposing products liability
on product sellers generally.36 In a nonproducts context, this concept
resembles the marriage oath, whereby one spouse agrees to take the other
in sickness and in health.
A concern related to the continued existence of A after a business
purchase by B is whether B should be held liable when it purchases only
one of several lines of business from A." This situation involves not only
33. Hickman v. Thomas C., Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D. Colo. 1984); Jacobs v.
Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
34. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 34, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 581 (1977).
35. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability
Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 29 (1986); Murphy, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corpora-
tion's Liability for Its Predecessor's Products When the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's As-
sets for Cash, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 815, 835-36 (1988); Note, Products Liability of Successor
Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 689 n.79 (1983).
36. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
37. Kline v. Johns Manville, 745 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1984) (no successor liability where B
purchased only one product line, did not use A's name, A stayed in business for 20 years thereafter
before filing for bankruptcy, and B stopped making the product approximately 10 years before plain-
tiff's suit); Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 201 (D. Md. 1988) (no successor
liability where B purchased only one division constituting five percent of the total operations of A,
which remained in existence); Conway v. White Tracks, 697 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (no
liability where B acquired only one product line of A through bankruptcy proceedings); In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (no successor liability where B purchased one "out
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a continuation of A after the purchase, but also a transaction in which B
does not purchase substantially all the assets of A. This situation should
present no additional analytical problem beyond A's continued existence.
One can view a corporation with several lines of business as a group of
corporations. Indeed, in this situation the separate lines of business can
be incorporated separately as subsidiaries of another corporation.
Whether or not the separate corporation form is used for different lines
of business, B's purchase of one of those lines is in fact a purchase of a
.separate business.
C. The Small Corporation and The Economic Burden
of Successor Liability
Several courts and commentators have raised doubts about the eco-
nomic feasibility of imposing successor liability on small corporations-
however "small" is defined in this context.3" It has been said that about
ninety percent of American enterprises consists of "small" corporations,
and that these entities lack the ability to shoulder effectively successor
liability, particularly at a time when products liability insurance in many
areas has become unaffordable or unavailable.39
The argument for protecting small business from this economic burden
cuts too far, however. The products liability and insurance burden for
small corporations should be no more onerous in a successor liability
context than it is for small corporations generally-unless one can con-
clude that corporate takeovers typically result in the sale of more danger-
ous products than those produced by B prior to the takeover. No
evidence supports the existence of such a greater danger generally. If, on
the other hand, such evidence did exist, it would argue in favor of succes-
sor liability and against such dangerous takeovers; no social benefit re-
sults from encouraging dangerous-product takeovers. Product
of hundreds" ofA's products and A continued to exist for 20 years thereafter before filing for bank-
ruptcy); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258, 692 P.2d 787 (1984) (no successor liability
where B purchased one product line, A later bankrupted, and B did not hold itself out as the continu-
ation of A and did not purchase A's name or goodwill).
38. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986); Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co.,
190 Cal. App. 3d 1546, 236 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1987); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 479
A.2d 126 (1984); Schiff, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the Product User
and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1000 (1980).
39. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1986); Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,
126 Wis.2d 293, 308 n.l, 376 N.W.2d 820, 827 & n.1 (1985).
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innovation and development may result in greater liability exposure than
status quo production, but again this phenomenon is not unique to busi-
ness acquisitions. There is no evidence, moreover, that successor liabil-
ity tends to fall more on small corporations than on large ones in this
country. The reality may be just the other way around.
Developing a meaningful definition of a small corporation for purposes
of determining liability in the successor context is difficult. Currently,
definitions vary.4 The United States Small Business Act defines a small
business as "one which is independently owned and operated and which
is not dominant in its field of operation."41 A determination of domi-
nance in this context must certainly be problematic, involving questions
of geographic and temporal domination. This definition would presuma-
bly exclude, moreover, a small and nondominant corporation that is
owned by another such corporation.
Other definitions consider the number of employees, the amount of
assets, and the business volume of the corporation.42 In addition to rais-
ing difficult questions of the interrelation of these three factors, the defi-
nitions suffer from a mechanical rigidity that is inappropriate in the
context of determining successor liability.
Putting aside the difficulty of defining the small corporation, the judi-
cial and academic concern in this regard is apparently based on the dual
premise first, that small corporations are more desirable than large ones
and should therefore be given special economic incentives in the context
of products liability, and second, that small corporations cannot reason-
ably accommodate successor products liability exposure. The first prong
presents complex economic policy questions unsuitable for judicial reso-
lution. The second prong is based only on conjecture, and is subject to
serious doubt now that the so-called "insurance crisis" seems to be
abating.43
Although small enterprises may hold a special place in the hearts of
American citizenry, that same citizenry surely expects its enterprises to
pay their way. If a company cannot afford to operate-because of the
costs of insurance, of raw materials, of wages, or for other reasons-then
40, Schiff, supra note 38, at 1002 n.10.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1986).
42. Schiff, supra note 38, at 1002 n.10.
43. Vandall, Our Product Liability System: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 64
DEN. U.L. REV. 703, 706 (1988).
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it is probably better socially, as well as economically, that that company
not operate.
III. POST-ACQUISITION REMEDIAL DUTIES
A number of courts have recognized a duty on the part of B, when
acquiring the business of A, to warn A's former customers of dangers
associated with the use of A's products. They have imposed this duty
regardless of whether B's acquisition of A's business is deemed to give
rise to successor liability under the principles previously discussed.44
When, however, a court would not impose successor corporation lia-
bility-because of lack of shareholder or employee continuity, because of
the continued existence of A after the acquisition, or otherwise-then this
duty to warn has been narrowly defined. To find liability courts usually
require either that B accede to the service contracts of A, or that B actu-
ally undertake to service A's former customers. In addition, before B can
be held liable courts require that B have actual knowledge of the location
and danger of a product that was sold by A and is subject to service by
B.
45
The reason this duty thus far has been so narrowly defined is unclear.
In the context of products law generally, the post-sale duty of a products
seller may be generally to warn the buyer about unreasonable dangers of
which the seller either knows or should know, without regard to whether
the seller is under any contractual or other duty to service the product.46
If a warning is likely to be inadequate, then the seller may have a duty to
take other reasonable measures such as the repair of the product, with or
44. See Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437
(1983). See also Murphy, supra note 35, at 846-50 (advocating expanded use against successor cor-
porations of a post-sale duty to warn).
45. Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (duty to warn if Bsucceeds to
A's service contracts, the product that injures plaintiff is covered by such a contract, B has serviced
the product, and B knows of the defect and location of the product); La Polio v. General Elec. Co.,
664 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1987) (duty to warn may arise based on service contract and B's knowl-
edge of the defect and product location, though no actual service of the product by B has occurred).
In Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984), the court said a
duty to warn can arise where B acquires A's service contracts, the product that injures plaintiff is
covered by such a contract, and B knows the location and owner of the product. This list, the court
noted, is not exhaustive, because "the courts appear to have employed a risk/benefit analysis to
determine whether it would be just to impose such a duty." Id. at 125.
46. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1967); Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d
864, 871-72 (N.Y. App. 1984); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 205 (1979).
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without charge.47
Perhaps courts have narrowly defined B's post-acquisition duty where
B does not succeed to A's general liability for products because they do
not perceive a basis for imposing such a duty. The basis is readily appar-
ent, however, in the special relation between A and B and between B and
A's products.48 That courts impose any duty to warn at all demonstrates
that a basis for a broader duty exists. The remaining question is why the
post-acquisition duty should not extend to match the duty to warn as it
exists in products law generally, and as it presumably exists where B
accedes to A's products liability through a business acquisition.
Thus far, courts have defined the post-sale duty to take remedial meas-
ures in terms of reasonable care, and not in terms of strict liability.49
This restricted definition may make little difference to courts that define
the general products liability duty to warn in terms of due care.50 For
those courts that treat the warning duty in strict liability terms,51 it may
be a small step to extend that liability to post-sale duties as well.
There are a number of advantages to broadening the post-acquisition
remedial duty of B. The imposition of such a duty obviates difficult ques-
tions of accrual associated with statutes of limitations and statutes of re-
pose, because this duty is a continuing one that should toll these
statutes. 52 It also eliminates or simplifies difficult questions that some-
times arise in tracing a defect to the date of manufacture and sale.53 A
post-sale duty can presumably arise to correct defects even though they
never existed at the time of sale.
47. Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1983); Balido v. Improved
Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972). But see Leannais v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (successor corporation had duty to warn product owners
after it became aware of danger, but no "affirmative duty to conduct and develop safety programs for
machines it did not design or manufacture," because such a duty "would be too burdensome").
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
49. E.g., Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1983) (under Virginia law successor
manufacturer may be liable on negligence theory for failing to warn consumer of dangerous products
when failure to warn is unreasonable).
50. See J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 212-13 (3d ed. 1988).
51. See id.
52. Brown v. Merrow Machine Co., 411 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Conn. 1976). But see Wilson v.
Dake Corp., 497 F. Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (Tennessee statute of limitations began to
run at time plaintiff purchased defective machine and barred suit despite continuing duty of manu-
facturer to warn).
53. Typically, plaintiff must show that the defect existed when the product left defendant's
control. Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974). But this requirement
should be obviated where a post-sale duty on the part of the defendant arises.
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Perhaps most important in this regard is that expansion of B's post-
acquisition remedial duties provides a traditional and widely accepted
basis for attaching responsibility to B for products sold by A. It also
provides a basis for bridging the gap between business acquisitions that
generally give rise to successor liability and those that do not. If the
post-acquisition remedial duty is substantially the same in both these sit-
uations, then reasons for distinguishing the situations become even less
persuasive.
IV. OTHER LIABILITY-PREVENTION DEVICES
In addition to warning of or correcting problems in A's products, there
are other ways that B, on acquiring A 's business, can act to eliminate or
curtail its liability for products sold by A before the acquisition. It may
be practical to obtain indemnity agreements from key stockholders of
A.54 Alternatively, it may be possible to establish an escrow fund to cover
potential liability for products sold by A. B may be able to negotiate a
price reduction for the purchase of the business that roughly reflects an-
ticipated successor products liability exposure. B also has the option of
placing the business acquisition in a subsidiary corporation. This latter
device will not protect the subsidiary from potential successor liability,
but it will cap B's exposure for such liability to the extent of the subsidi-
ary's net worth. If, however, B purchases adequate products liability in-
surance to cover successor exposure, then no apparent reason exists to
establish a subsidiary to limit such exposure.
Another method likely to avoid successor liability is for B to substan-
tially change the product line or business after its acquisition from A."5
To the extent that the business is purchased for the very purpose of capi-
talizing on its historic reputation, this approach provides no attraction
for B. On the other hand, B should recognize that if it intends to capital-
ize on A 's historic business, it must also be prepared to assume the prod-
ucts liability associated with that business.
Hard questions remain where B acquires and continues A 's business
54. Most states substantially restrict common law and statutory remedies against the stock-
holders of a dissolved corporation. See Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr. 651
(1988).
55. See Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1986); Lundell v. Sidney
Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Cal. App. 1987); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986).
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for a period of time, and then substantially changes that business.56
What should be done with A's products claims that arise after such a
change? Absent a statutory determination of the length of time of opera-
tion necessary to impose successor liability, the issue should be deter-
mined by the same broad standards of reasonableness that are used to
assess successor business continuation in the first instance. If B buys A's
business and moves as quickly as is practical to convert it to a new busi-
ness, successor liability probably should not attach. On the other hand,
if B continues A's business for a substantial period before making such a
changeover, the court should impose liability.
V. CONCLUSION
It does not seem feasible to fix a bright-line rule for determining suc-
cessor corporation liability. The issue turns on the broad question of
whether B reasonably can be considered to have substantially continued
A's business for a significant period of time after acquiring that business.
Probably most business persons can make this judgment call fairly well.
The presence or absence of shareholder or employee continuity between
A and B does not materially aid this determination. Nor does the ques-
tion of whether A continues to exist in some legal form after the business
acquisition by B.
A good deal of the line drawing in this area probably can be reduced
by expanding B's post-acquisition remedial duties with regard to A's
product. Such an expansion would lessen the concern about the basis for
holding B responsible for products sold by A. B can of course take other
preventive measures besides post-acquisition remediation-measures
ranging from escrow and indemnity agreements, price negotiation, and
establishment of a corporate subsidiary for operating the acquired busi-
ness, to substantial change of the business itself-to ensure that B will
not be considered as continuing the operation of that business.
Just as Pirandello as an author found it necessary to conceptualize the
six characters in search of an author if his play were to take form, so the
courts must provide meaningful and persuasive conceptions for imposing
successor corporation products liability. The reason for producing such
56. Compare Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1984) (successor not liable in
suit in which it made the product for about 10 years and then stopped making the product approxi-
mately 10 years before plaintiff's injury) with Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d
826 (1981) (successor liable where it made product for about eight years and then sold the product
line about four years before plaintiff's injury).
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conceptions is apparent. Corporate concepts aside, a business successor
often so closely resembles a predecessor that it seems fair to treat them as
the same enterprise. The courts should place greater trust than they have
to date in the good judgment of the factfinder to make common sense
determinations of that character resemblance.
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